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LECTURES

LAW, MORALITY, AND "SEXUAL ORIENTATION"*
JOHN

M.

FINNIS**

I.
During the past thirty years there has emerged in Europe a
standard form of legal regulation of sexual conduct. This standard form or scheme, which I shall call the "standard modern
[European] position," is accepted by the European Court of
Human Rights and the European Commission of Human Rights
(the two supra-national judicial and quasi-judicial institutions of
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms (1950), to which almost all European states are party, whether or not they are also party to the
European [Economic] Community now known as the European
Union). The standard modern European position has two limbs.
On the one hand, the state is not authorized to, and does not,
make it a punishable offence for adult consenting persons to
engage, in private, in immoral sexual acts (for example, homosexual acts). On the other hand, states do have the authority to
discourage, say homosexual conduct and "orientation" (i.e.
overtly manifested active willingness to engage in homosexual
conduct). And typically, though not universally, they do so. That
is to say, they maintain various criminal and administrative laws
and policies which have as part of their purpose the discouraging
of such conduct.. Many of these laws, regulations, and policies
discriminate (i.e. distinguish) between heterosexual and homosexual conduct adversely to the latter.
* Copyright © 1994, Notre Dame Law Review, University of Notre Dame.
Reprinted with permission from Notre Dame Law Review, Volume 69, Number 5
(1994), 1049-76. Since its original publication, -Dr. Finnis has provided
additional comments which appear in brackets. The Notre DameJournalof Law,
Ethics & Public Policy bears responsibility for any errors which may have
occurred in reprinting or editing.
** Professor of Law and Legal Philosophy, University of Oxford and
Fellow of University College, Oxford; Huber Distinguished Visiting Professor of
Law, Boston College, 1993-94.
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In England, for example, well after Parliament's decriminalization of private adult homosexual conduct by the Sexual
Offences Act 1967, the highest court (the House of Lords) reaffirmed that a jury may lawfully convict on a charge of conspiring
to corrupt public morals by publishing advertisements by private
individuals, of their availability for (non-commercial). private
homosexual acts.' The Court of Appeal has constantly reaffirmed, notably in 1977, 1981 and 1990,' that public soliciting-of
adult males by adult males falls within the statutory prohibition
of "importun[ing] in a public place for an immoral purpose."3
Parliament has peacefully accepted both these judicial interpretations of the constitutional, statutory and common law position.
It has also voted more than once to maintain the legal position
whereby the age of consent for lawful intercourse is 21 for homosexual but 16 for heterosexual intercourse;' in February 1994 the
House of Commons voted to make the homosexual age of consent 18, which would reduce but retain the differentiation
between homosexual and heterosexual conduct.5 In 1988, Parliament specifically prohibited local governments in England from
doing- anything to "intentionally promote homosexuality" or
"promote the teaching in any maintained school of the acceptability of homosexuality as a pretended family relationship."' The
provisions of English law relating to marriage and to adoption
similarly manifest a purpose or at least a willingness to discourage homosexual conduct and impede its promotion by any form
of invitatory activity other than between consenting adults and in
a truly private milieu.
1. Knuller (Publishing, Printing and Promotions) Ltd. v. Director of Pub.
Prosecutions, [1973] A.C. 435 (1972).
2. Regina v. Goddard, 92 Crim. App. R. 185 (1990); Regina v. Gray 74
Crim. App. R. 324 (1981); Regina v. Ford, 66 Crim. App. R. 46 (1977).
3. Sexual Offences Act 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, ch. 69, § 32 (Eng.).
4. Id. § 6(1) (heterosexual acts: age of consent 16); Sexual Offences Act,
1967, ch. 60, § 1 (1) (Eng.) (homosexual acts: age of consent 21).
5. The bill has yet to be passed by the House of Lords. [The bill has since
been passed by the House of Lords; see Criminal Justice and Public Order Act
1994, ch. 33, § 145 (Eng.), enacted and in force November 3, 1994.]

6. The statute states:
2A(1) A local authority shall not(a) intentionally promote homosexuality or publish material with the intention
of promoting homosexuality;
(b) promote the teaching in any maintained school of the acceptability of
homosexuality as a pretended family relationship. Local Government Act 1986,
ch. 10, § 2A (Eng.), inserted by Local Government Act 1988, ch. 9, § 28 (Eng.).
A "maintained school" is any school funded by a local governmental
authority and includes most of the schools in England.
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The English position as outlined above is in 'full conformity
with the position upheld by the European human rights institutions. When the European Court of Human Rights in 1981
adopted (and in 1988 reaffirmed) the position which Parliament
in England had taken in 1967, it ruled that penal prohibition of
private adult homosexual activity is not necessary for the securing
of the state's legitimate aim of protecting morals.7 In doing so,
the court expressly left unscathed, and in principle confirmed,
the decision of March 13, 1980 of the European Commission of
Human Rights (and of the Commission on October 12, 1978 and
the Council of Ministers by Resolution DH (79) 5 of June 12,
1979) that states can properly prohibit private consensual homosexual acts involving a male under 21 notwithstanding the Convention right of non-discrimination in the legal protection of
rights and notwithstanding that the state law in question made 16
the "age of consent" for heterosexual intercourse (and 18 the
age of majority for other purposes).
The Commission has subsequently reaffirmed that decision
and has declared unarguable ("inadmissible" for further judicial
process) complaints made, under the Convention's anti-discrimination provisions, against the long-standing Swiss law which
criminalizes homosexual prostitution (male or female) but not
heterosexual prostitution.'
II.

The standard modern [European] position is consistent with
the view that (apart perhaps from special cases and contexts) it is
unjust for A to impose any kind of disadvantage on B simply
because A believes (perhaps correctly) that B has sexual inclinations (which he may or may not act on) towards persons of the
same sex. (Special cases are more likely to arise, for example,
where B's inclination is towards "man-boy love," i.e. pederasty.)
The position does not give B the widest conceivable legal protection against such unjust discrimination (just as it generally does
not give wide protection against needless acts of adverse private
discrimination in housing or employment to people with unpopular or eccentric political views). But the position does not itself
encourage, sponsor or impose any such unjust burden. (And it is
7. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 21 (ser.A) (1981);
Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. 20 (ser.A) (1988).
8. Application 11680/85, decision of March 10, 1988, unpublished; see
MiRiLuE DELMA-MARriY, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF

HuMAN RIGHTS:
253-54 (1992).

INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION VERSUS NATIONAL RESTRICrIONS
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accompanied by many legal protections for homosexual persons
with respect to assaults, threats, unreasonable discrimination by
public bodies and officials, etc.)
The concern of the standard modem position itself is not
with inclinations but entirely with certain decisions to express or
manifest deliberate, promotion of, or readiness to engage in,
homosexual activity or conduct, including promotion of forms of
life (e.g. purportedly marital cohabitation) which both
encourage such activity and present it as a valid or acceptable
alternative to the committed heterosexual union which'the state
recognizes as marriage. Subject only to the written or unwritten
constitutional requirement of freedom of discussion of ideas, the
state laws and state policies which I have outlined are intended to
discourage- decisions which are thus deliberately oriented
towards homosexual conduct and are manifested in public ways.
The standard modem position differs from the position
which it replaced, which made adult consensual sodomy and like
acts crimes per se. States which adhere to the standard modern
position make it clear by laws and policies such as I have referred
to that the state has by no means renounced its legitimate concern with public morality and the education of children and
young people towards truly worthwhile and against alluring but
bad forms of conduct and life. Nor have such states renounced
the judgment that a life involving homosexual conduct is bad
even for anyone unfortunate enough to have innate or quasiinnate homosexual inclinations.
The difference between the standard modem position and
the position it has replaced can be expressed as follows. The standard modern position considers that the state's proper responsi
bility for upholding true worth (morality) is a responsibility
subsidiary (auxiliary) to the primary responsibility of parents and
non-political voluntary associations. The subsidiary character of
government is widely emphasized and increasingly accepted, at
least in principle, in contemporary European politics. (It was, for
example, a cornerstone of the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992.) This
conception of the proper role of government has been taken to
exclude the state from assuming a directly parental disciplinary
role in relation to consenting adults. That role was one which
political theory and practice formerly ascribed to the state on the
assumption that the role followed by logical necessity from the
truth that the state should encourage true worth and discourage
immorality. That assumption is now judged to be mistaken (a
judgment for which I shall argue in the final part of this lecture).
So the modern theory and practice draws a distinction not
drawn in the former legal arrangements-a distinction between
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(a) supervising the truly private conduct of adults'and (b) supervising the public realm or environment. The importance of the latter
includes the following considerations: (1) this is the environment
or public realm in which young people (of whatever sexual inclination) are educated; (2) it is the context in which and by which
everyone with responsibility for the well being of young people is
helped or hindered in assisting them to avoid bad forms of life;
(3) it is the milieu in which and by which all citizens are
encouraged and helped, or discouraged and undermined, in
their own resistance to being lured by temptation into falling
away from their own aspirations to be people of integrated good
character, and to be autonomous, self-controlled persons rather
than slaves to impulse and sensual gratification.
While the type (a) supervision of truly private adult.consensual conduct is now considered to be outside the state's normally
proper role (with exceptions such as sado-masochistic bodily
damage, and assistance in suicide), type (b) supervision of the
moral-cultural-educational environment is maintained as a very
important part of the state's justification for claiming legitimately
the loyalty of its decent citizens.
III.
The standard modem position is part of a politico-legal
order which systematically outlaws many forms of discrimination.
Thus the European Convention on Human Rights (model for
several dozen constitutions enacted over the past thirty-five years
by the British authorities, for nations gaining independence)
provides that the protection of the rights it sets out is to be
enjoyed without discrimination on any ground such as "sex, race,
colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth
or other status."
But the standard modern position deliberately rejects proposals to include in such lists the item "sexual orientation." The
explanation commonly given (correctly, in my opinion) is this.
The phrase "sexual orientation" is radically equivocal. Particularly as used by promoters of "gay rights," the phrase ambiguously assimilates two things which the standard modern position
carefully distinguishes: (I) a psychological or psychosomatic disposition inwardly orienting one towards homosexual activity; (II)
the deliberate decision so to orient one's public behavior as to
express or manifest one's active interest in and endorsement of
homosexual conduct and/or forms of life which presumptively
involve such conduct.
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It is also widely observed that laws or proposed laws outlawing "discrimination based on sexual orientation" are always interpreted by "gay rights" movements as going far beyond
discrimination based merely on A's belief that B is sexually
attracted to persons of the same sex. Instead (it is observed), "gay
rights" movements interpret the phrase as extending full legal
protection to public activities intended specifically to promote,
procure and facilitate homosexual conduct.
It has been noticed in public circles in Europe that such laws
have indeed been interpreted by American courts as having just
such an implication. An example which has been widely reported
is the Georgetown University case,' requiring a religiously affiliated educational institution to give equal access to its facilities to
organizations "participating in and promoting homosexual lifestyles [which necessarily include homosexual conduct]" in manifest opposition to the moral beliefs and teachings of the religion
with which that institution professed an association.
So, while the standard position accepts that acts of type (I)
discrimination are unjust, itjudges that there are compelling reasons both to deny that such injustice would be appropriately remedied by laws against "discrimination based on sexual
orientation," and to hold that such a "remedy" would work significant discrimination and injustice against (and would indeed
damage) families, associations and institutions which have organized themselves to live out and transmit ideals of family life that
include a high conception of the worth of truly conjugal sexual
intercourse.
It is in fact accepted by almost everyone, on both sides of the
political debate, that the adoption of a law framed to prohibit
"discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation" would require
the prompt abandonment of all attempts by the political community to discourage homosexual conduct by means of educational
policies, restrictions on prostitution, non-recognition of homosexual "marriages" and adoptions, and so forth. It is judged (and
in my view soundly) that the law itself would perforce have
changed from teaching, in many ways, that homosexual conduct
is bad to teaching, massively, that it is a type of sexual activity as
good as any other (and per se much less involved with onerous
responsibilities than is the sexual union of husband and wife or,
in perhaps other ways, the life of those who live in unmarried
chastity).
9. Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown
Univ., 536 A-2d 1 (D.C. 1987).
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IV.
The standard modem position involves a number of explicit
or implicit judgments about the proper role of law and the compelling interests of political communities, and about the evil of
homosexual conduct. Can these be defended by reflective, critical, publicly intelligible and rational arguments? I believe they
can. Since even the advocates of "gay rights" do not seriously
assert that the state can never have any compelling interests in
public morality or the moral formation of its young people or the
moral environment in which parents, other educators, and
young people themselves must undertake this formation, I shall
in this lecture focus rather on the underlying issue which
receives far too little ,public discussion: What is wrong with homosexual conduct? Is the judgment that it is morally wrong inevitably a manifestation either of mere hostility to a hated minority,
or of purely religious, theological, and sectarian belief which can
ground no constitutionally valid determination disadvantaging
those who do not conform to it?
I have been using and shall continue to use the terms
"homosexual activity," "homosexual acts" and "homosexual conduct" synonymously, to refer to bodily acts, on the body of a person of the same sex, which are engaged in with a view to securing
orgasmic sexual satisfaction for one or more of the parties.
Let me begin by noticing a too little noticed fact. All three of
the greatest Greek philosophers, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle,
regarded homosexual conduct as intrinsically shameful, immoral,
and indeed depraved or depraving. That is to say, all three
rejected the linchpin of modem "gay" ideology and lifestyle.
Socrates is portrayed by Plato (and by Xenophon) as having
strong homosexual (as well as heterosexual) inclinations or interest, and as promoting an ideal of homosexual romance between
men and youths, but at the same time as utterly rejecting homosexual conduct. This is made clear in Sir Kenneth Dover's book
Greek Homosexuality;1 in Dover's summarizing words: "Xenophon's Socrates lacks the sensibility and urbanity of the Platonic
Socrates, but there is no doubt that both of them condemn
homosexual copulation."" It is also made clear by Gregory Vlastos in his last book, precisely on Socrates: In Socratic eros involving relationships of affection between men and boys or youths,
intimacy is limited to mind- and eye-contact and "terminal gratifi10.
11.

KENNETHJ.

Id.

at 159.

DoVER, GREEK HOMOSEXUALITY 154-59 (1978).
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cation" is forbidden 12 (and a fortiori in relationships between
adult males, since virtually all Athenians regarded sex acts
between adult males as intrinsically shameful).'" Vlastos thus
makes it clear that Socrates forbids precisely what I have been
calling homosexual conduct.
In the recent Amendment 2 case in Colorado, Evans v.
Romer,4 the widely influential classical philosopher Professor
Martha Nussbaum gave oral and written evidence on these matters, as expert witness for plaintiffs who seek to overturn a provision of the Colorado Constitution which provides that no official
body in Colorado may adopt any law or policy "whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of... a claim
to minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of
discrimination." In her oral testimony (on October 15, 1993),
she flatly denied that Dover's book Greek Homosexuality came to
the conclusion that Socrates condemned homosexual copulation. Dover concluded only, she said, that Socrates condemned
the seduction of students. A few days later, the Princeton legal
and political-theoretical scholar Professor Robert George gave
evidence to show that Dover's book unequivocally concludes that
Socrates, as portrayed by our two sources Plato and Xenophon,
condemned homosexual copulation as such, and did not confine
the prohibition to any particular relationships. Professor Nussbaum promptly wrote" to George asserting that that was false
testimony given in reckless disregard of the truth. Demanding
peremptorily that George retract before the close of the trial on
October 22, 1993, she claimed that Dover himself would person12.

GREcoRY VLAsros, SOCRATES, IRONIST AND MOAL PHILOSOPHER 38-39

(1991).
13. Clifford Hindley & David Cohen, Debate: Law, Society, and
Homosexuality in Classica Athens, 133 PAST & PRESENT 167, 179-80, 188 n.14
(1991).
14. No. 92CV7223 (D. Den., filed Nov. 12, 1992):
15. Letter from Martha Nussbaum, Professor of Philosophy and Classics,
Brown University (Oct. 20, 1993). The letter was faxed on October 21, 1993.
[On the various misuses of scholarship by Professor Nussbaum in connection
with the Colorado Amendment 2 litigation, some of which are outlined in text
accompanying notes 14-34a, see John M. Finnis, "Shameless Acts" in Colorado:
Abuse of Scholarship in ConstitutionalCases, 7 ACAD. QUESTIONS 10, 19-41 (1994).
In Martha C. Nussbaum, PlatonicLove and ColoradoLaws: The Relevance of Ancient
Greek Norms to Modem Sexual Controversies, 80 VA. L. REv. 1515 (1994) (cited in

MichaelJ. Perry, The Morality of Homosexual Conduct: A Response to John Finnis,9
NORE DAME J.L. ETmICS & PUB. POL'Y 41, 45 n.15 (1995)), which appeared
after my lpresent article's original publication and after "Shameless Acts"went to
pi-int, Professor Nussbaum fails to confront, let alone refute or undermine, my
charges of misuse of scholarship.]
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ally support her reading of his conclusion about Socrates. In the
event, Dover wrote to me on January 23, 1994, and authorizes me
to quote him:
-It is certainly my opinion that the Socrates of Plato and
Xenophon condemned homosexual copulation as such,
and did not confine the prohibition to any particular relationships. I certainly meant to say that on pp. 159f. of my
book.16

What, then, about Plato? Well, the same Plato who in his
Symposium wrote a famous celebration of romantic and spiritual
man-boy erotic relationships, made very clear that all forms of
sexual conduct outside heterosexual marriage are shameful,
wrongful and harmful This is particularly evident from his treatment of the matter in his last work, the Laws, but is also sufficiently clear in the Republic and the Phaedrus, and even in the
Symposium itself. This is affirmed unequivocally both by Dover
16. Letter from KennethJ. Dover. (Jan. 23, 1994) (on file with author).
[In an appendix to Nussbaum, Platonic Love, supra note 15, Nussbaum and
Dover, writing jointly, state that "Finnis' use of Dover's letter [in the passage to
which the present footnote is attached] to support Finnis' own position is
inappropriate" because "condemns" (and presumably "prohibit[s]" - which
they omit from their quotation from Dover's letter) "does not mean 'condemns
as wicked and depraving.'" Id. at.1645. Here and in other passages they have
foisted the word "wicked" onto my text in place of the word "shameful." I have
never contended that Socrates or Plato thought homosexual sex acts wicked just shameful, immoral and indeed depraved or depraving (and if the latter
terms are thought too strong, I am content with "shameful and immoral"). The
Dover-Nussbaum appendix states that in various ways (only vaguely specified),
Dover now wishes to revise the assessment of Socrates and Plato which he stated
in both editions of his book. Id. at 1645, 1648. In his book, Dover led up to his
conclusion about Socrates by noting [1] that in PLATO, EUrHmYEMUS 282b,
Socrates "significant[1y]" insinuates that sex between male lovers is
dishonorable, and [2] that "[a]ccording to Xen[ophon] Merm[orabilia Socratis] i
2.29f enmity between Kritias and Socrates arose from the following incident:
[Socrates] saw that Kritias was in love with Euthydemos and wanting to
deal with [Euthydemos] in the manner of those who enjoy the body for
sexual intercourse.... Socrates, in the presence of Euthydemos and
many other people, said that he thought Kritias was no better off than
a.pig if he wanted to scratch himself against Euthydemos as piglets do
against stones." ,
DOVER, supranote 10, at 159. In their appendix, Dover and Nussbaum now try
to evade the significance of this scathing insinuation that sex between male
lovers is shameful, pig-like conduct (a suggestion which neither Plato's nor
Xenophon's Socrates makes in relation to marital intercourse); they do so by
offering, instead of a quotation from Dover or Xenophon, the following paraphrase of Xenophon's punchline, a paraphrase which I quote in full: "sexual
gratification resembles scratching an itch, it is a relief from tension, not a good
in itself"I Nussbaum, PlatonicLove, supranote 15, at 1646. This is characteristic
of the neutering of inconvenient texts throughout Nussbaum's article.]
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and by Vlastos, neither of whom has any favor for these views of
Plato. According to Vlastos, for example, Plato:
saw anal intercourse as "contrary to nature," [footnote:
Ph[aejdr[usj251A1, L[aws] 636-7] a degradation not only

of man's humanity, but even of his animality .... 7
It is for Plato, Vlastos adds, a type of act far more serious than any
mere going "contrary to the rules.""8
On Plato, Martha Nussbaum's oral evidence took a remarkable course. She claimed that the translation of Laws 636's which
had been quoted to the court in my affidavit was inaccurate;
instead of the phrase "those guilty of such enormities," it should
have read, in morally neutral terms, "those who first ventured to
do these things." Therefore, none of the translations of or references to Plato in my affidavit could be relied upon, and Plato in
fact approved of homosexual conduct. Robert George then gave
evidence that all the existing English translations, without exception, translate the relevant Greek phrase with some pejorative
term, or use a pejorative term about the same conduct at an
equivalent point in the previous sentence; and that in particular
17. GREx.oity VLASTOs, PLATONIC STUDIES 25 (2d ed. 1981). In the
footnote, Vlastos complains that by paraphusin, "contrary to nature", Plato here
and in 836B-C meant something "far stronger" than the phrase "against the
rules", which Dover had used in a 1966 article on eros and nomos. Sometime
before the revised edition, Vlastos and Dover corresponded about this
complaint, and Vlastos records a letter from Dover.
What [Plato] did believe was that the act was "unnatural", in the sense
"against the rules"; it was a morally ignorant exploitation of pleasure
beyond what was "granted" (kata phusin apodedostha, [Laws] 636C4),
the product of an akrateia, ([636]C6), which can be aggravated by
habituation and bad example. His comparison of homosexuality with
incest ([Laws] 837E8-838E1) is particularly revealing.
Id at 424. And Vlastos immediately remarks that Dover's allusion to Plato's
comparison of homosexuality with incest shows that Dover acknowledges the
great force with which Plato is condemning what Vlastos called "anal intercourse" and Dover, loosely, "the act" and "homosexuality". Id. at 25, 424.
[Among the many pieces of relevant evidence left unconsidered in the DoverNussbaum critique of the present article, supra note 16, are the passages from
Vlastos and Dover just quoted.]
18. Id. at 25. I want to add, out of respect for Plato, that Anthony Price's
valuable book firmly rejects Vlastos' theory that Socrates and Plato, though
forbidding homosexual acts, accepted that lovers could nevertheless rightly
engage in the sort of petting spoken of in Phaedrus 255e. ANTHONY W. PRICE,
LOVE AND FRIENDSHIP IN PLATO AND AIsToTLE 89-94 (1989).
19. "When male unites with female for procreation the pleasure
experienced is held to be natural, but unnatural when male mates with male or
female with female, and those first guilty of these enormities were impelled by
their weakness for pleasure." PLATO, LAws I, 636C, at 41 (R.G. Bury trans.,
1926).
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the philologist Sir Kenneth Dover translates the relevant Greek
word, tolmema, as "crime" (meaning moral crime). So in her affidavit, delivered on the last day of the trial, Professor Nussbaum
stated that Liddell & Scott, "the authoritative Greek dictionary
relied on by all scholars in this area," translates tolmema with only
the favorable or neutral terms "an adventure, enterprise, deed of
daring."2 ° In fact, however, Liddell & Scott translates it "adventure, enterprise, daring or shameless act."2" What Nussbaum had
donewas quote from the 1897 edition of the dictionary, an edition entirely superseded in 1940, doing so without disclosing to
the court the date or edition. In short, she put a dictionary
before the court precisely as "the authoritative dictionary relied
on by all scholars in the area," but the quotation which she said
was from that dictionary was in fact from a dictionary which is not
authoritative or relied upon by any scholars. And she did so
because to have quoted from the real "authoritative dictionary"
would have destroyed the fundamental contention of her oral
evidence about Plato, while to have allowed the court to know
the truth about the long-superseded nineteenth century source
of her lexicography would have deprived her testimony of the
appearance of authoritative support which it so badly needed to
offset the devastating counter-witness of Dover.
In her oral testimony, she flatly denied that Dover's study of
Plato concludes that Plato condemned all homosexual copulation. No, she said, Dover concluded only that Plato condemned
sex involving bribery or prostitution. Once again, Dover, having
been put on notice of that contention, permits me to quote his
letter ofJanuary 23, 1994: "Plato condemns all homosexual copulation (pp. 165-8 in my book)."22
A key element in Plato's condemnation of homosexual conduct is his repeated judgment, in the Phaedrusand the Laws, that
it is para phusin, contrary to nature. On this matter, Professor
Nussbaum's testimony was clear:
the terms tendentiously translated "according to nature"
and "unnatural" or "contrary to nature" actually refer (in
my own expert opinion and the consensus of recent scholars such as Price, whose study of the passage [in the Laws]

20. Affidavit of Martha C. Nussbaum, at
10, Evans v. Romer, No.
92CV7223 (D.Den., filed Nov. 12, 1992) (Oct. 21, 1993) (served Oct. 22, 1993).
21. LIDDELL & ScoTr, A GREEK-ENGLISH LEXICON 1803 (Sir Henry Stuart
Jones & Roderick McKenzie eds., 9th ed. 1940, Supp. 1968) (1992).

22.

Dover, supra note 16.
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has been widely accepted) 2to
"birth" and not "nature" in
sense. 3
any normative moral
This claim about a consensus of recent scholars rejecting as tendentious the translation "unnatural" or "contrary to nature," or
supporting 'Nussbaum's. outlandish translation of para phusin, was
pure fabrication. According to Nussbaum herself, the "modem
consensus" on the matter formed itself around Price's "widely
accepted" study. Very well. But what Nussbaum says about Price's
study of the passage is, shockingly, the exact reverse of the truth.
That study unhesitatingly translates paraphusin, in Laws 636 and
841, as "unnatural". For example, its translation of 636c is:
"homosexual intercourse, between males 'or females, seems to
be
24
an unnatural [paraphusin] crime [tolmema] of the first rank." '
Let me summarize how Professor Nussbaum treated Price's
"widely accepted" study. Price's book translates these uses of para
phusin as "unnatural," and yet her statements under oath unambiguously imply that it rejects that translation as tendentious.
The conclusions of the book's long appendix on "Plato's Sexual
Morality" are squarely based on Price's reasoned judgment that
"unnatural" in these passages both conveyed and entailed Plato's
essential moral judgments on sexual conduct, yet Nussbaum
swears that it supports her denial that the term had "any normative moral sense" and her assertion that it signified for Plato no
more than inconsistency with a temporary pro-natalist colonial
politics. Nussbaum implicitly claims the support of Price's book
for her fundamental contention that the sexual morality put to

the court by Robert George and by me is purely theological,
Catholic and indeed narrowly Thomist in origin, and "simply has
no precedent in the ancient Greek secular exemplars of natural
23. Nussbaum, supra note 20, at 1 54. This "consensus of recent scholars
such as Price" becomes in the opening sentence of the following paragraph
"the modem consensus". An earlier reference makes it clear that the reference
to Price's "widely accepted" study of the passage is to his book, LovE AND
FRIENDSHIP IN PLATO AND ARISOTLE, supra note 18. The book was reviewed by
Professor Nussbaum in the Times Literay Supplement in February, 1990.
Throughout her discussion of the Laws in 1 51-55, Nussbaum refers to "the
passage," without ever identifying it or attending to the fact that in my affidavit
dated October 8, 1993, I had cited four passages, and had quoted two widely
separated passages each of which applies to homosexual acts the phrase on
which she is commenting in
54, para phusin. The only passage she has
explicitly cited to the court is the Laws 636 passage in book I, but some
confused remarks in 1 52, and the drift of 1 54, suggest that she may have had
Laws VIII, 841 uppermost in her mind in 1 54. It should not be overlooked that
the discordance between homosexual acts and phusis is plainly asserted by
Plato's mouthpiece also in Laws VIII, 836 & 838.
24. PRicE, supra note 18, at 230.
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law argumentation"2 5 including Plato 26 ; yet Price's book in fact
argues, prominently and very explicitly, that Plato's main positions on the morality of sexual conduct, evidenced by the Republic and the Phaedrusas well as by the Laws, were (rather to Price's
regret) substantially the same as the positions maintained in the
Catholic tradition's understanding of natural law.27'
The fabrication of the imaginary "modem consensus" about
paraphusin also required Professor Nussbaum to withhold from
the court the fact that the other scholarly authorities most prominently and frequently appealed to in her testimony-Dover,
Price, Vlastos, Winkler-all concur in using the terms "unnatural" or "contrary to nature" to translate paraphusinas predicated
of homosexual acts in Laws.2s All treat this translation as entirely
uncontroversial. All judge that paraphusin, as used by Plato in the
Laws, must be understood as the core of a very firm'and unqualified condemnation of homosexual conduct. All explicitly or
implicitly reject out of hand Nussbaum's assertion that "the passage" in the Laws "says nothing at all about sexual acts among
non-married people." Like even Halperin and Winkler (the
openly "gay" scholars also appealed to in Nussbaum's affidavit),
Dover, Price, and (as we shall see) Vlastos all judge that to know
or tell Plato's views on the morality, the immorality, of all such
non-marital conduct as homosexual sex acts, one need go no further thanthese unmistakably clear passages in the Laws, texts
with which every other text of Plato can readily be seen to be
consistent. 29
As for Aristotle, Dover's discussion is less satisfactory; it
neglects a number of relevant passages. Still, it does not contradict the scholarly consensus that Aristotle rejected homosexual
conduct. In fact, such conduct is frequently represented by Aristotle (in some cases directly and in other cases by a lecturer's
hint) as intrinsically perverse, shameful and harmful both to the
individuals involved and to society itself.3 0
25. Nussbaum, supra note 20, at 1 14.
26. Id. at 67.
27. PRICE, supra note 18, at 229-235 (note the references to Paul VI and
John Paul II, at 233, 235).
28. DOVER, supra note 10, at 165-68; VLAs-ros, supra note 17, at 25, 425;
JOHN J. WINKLER, THE CONSrRmNTS OF DESIRE

29.

See

18, 21n. (1990).

DAVID M. HALPERIN, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF HOMOSEXuALrIY
(1990); WINKLER, supra note 28, at 18, 21.

91

30. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHics VII, 5:1148b29; AsroTLE,
Poulcs II, 1:1252a33-39, together with the hints in II, 6:1269b28 and II,
7:1272a25.
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On Aristotle, the manipulations in Nussbaum's affidavit
were as thoroughgoing as we should by now expect. She associated Price's book with her affidavit's assertions that Aristotle
approved and endorsed homosexual acts. But in reality the Aristotle of Price's book is "rather shocked" even by Plato's Republic's
carefully and famously restricted suggestion that "the lover may
kiss and touch the beloved, with his consent, just like a son.""' The

final sentences of Price's reflections on Aristotle's view of erotic
love conclude that, for Aristotle, such love is properly either marital or pederastic; on the same page Price reminds us that for
Aristotle pederasty is not only as transient as boyhood but also
"should keep to its higher forms, 'looking rather than loving' as
Plato had put it."32 It is not to include homosexual sex acts. What
do we find Nussbaum saying? "I agree with Price's conclusion,"
she says, proceeding to quote Price's final sentences, but slicing
off, without any indication, the first fourteen words so that in
place of Price's reference to marriage and "pederasty" (thus
understood as excluding sex acts) she can substitute her own
words "heterosexual and homosexual relations" (understood as
including sex acts between males of any age). A similar falsifying

and unsignalled truncation occurs in her affidavit's only quotation from Aristotle himself, and all the other passages of Aristotle
that she cites are manifestly abused and misrepresented.
Although the ideology of homosexual love (with its accompanying devaluation of women) continued to have philosophical
defenders down to the end of classical Greek civilization, there
equally continued to be influential philosophical writers, wholly
untouched byJudaeo-Christian tradition, who taught that homosexual conduct is not only intrinsically shameful but also inconsistent with a proper recognition of the equality of women with
men in intrinsic worth. (The ancients did not fail to note that
Socrates' homoerotic orientation, for all its admirable chastityabstention from homosexual conduct-went along with a
neglect to treat his wife as an equal.) A good example of such
late classical writing is Plutarch's Erotikos, 3 written probably some
time in the early second century, but certainly free from JudaeoChristian influence. Plutarch's vast literary-historical and philosophical corpus of writings is an effort to recapture and recapitulate the highest achievements of classical civilization, and had a
very substantial influence on Western thought down to recent
31.

PRicE, supra note 18, at 224-25 (citing PLATO, REPUBUC 403b4-6 and

AmsromE, PoLmcs, 1262a32-7).
32. Id. (quoting PLATO, LAws VIII, 837C4-5).
33. PLUTARCH, ERoTIKOS, Dialogue on Love, 751C-D, 766E-771D.

1995)

LAW, MORALTY, AND "SEXUAL ORIENTATION"

times. I shall say more about Plutarch's thought on these matters
below.
Another example is the Stoic, Musonius Rufus (who taught
at Rome circa 80 A.D. and again was not influenced by Jewish or
Christian thought). He rejects all homosexual conduct as shameful. Sexual conduct is decent and acceptable only within marriage. The point of marriage includes not only procreation and
the raising of children, but also, integrally and essentially, a complete community of life and mutual care and affection between
husband and wife. 4
At the heart of the Platonic-Aristotelian and later ancient
philosophical rejections of all homosexual conduct, and thus of
the modern "gay" ideology, are three fundamental theses: (1).
The commitment of a man and woman to each other in the sexual union of marriage is intrinsically good and reasonable, and is
incompatible with sexual relations outside marriage. [s l (2)
Homosexual acts are radically and peculiarly non-marital, and
for that reason intrinsically unreasonable and unnatural. (3) Furthermore, according to Plato, if not Aristotle, homosexual acts
have a special similarity to solitary masturbation, and both types
of radically non-marital act are manifestly unworthy of the
human being and immoral.
V.
I want now to offer an interpretation of these three theses
which articulates them more clearly than was ever attempted by
Plato or, so far as we can tell, by Aristotle. It is, I think, an interpretation faithful to what they do say, but takes up suggestions in
Plutarch and in the eighteenth century Enlightenment philosophy of Immanuel Kant (who likewise rejected all homosexual
conduct), though even these writers' indications, too, remain relatively terse. My account also articulates thoughts which have historically been implicit in the judgments of many nonphilosophical people, and which have been held to justify the
laws adopted in many nations and states both before and after
the period when Christian beliefs as such were politically and
socially dominant. And it is an application of the theory of morality and natural law developed over the past thirty years by
34. Musonius Rufus, Discourses XII and XIIIA, in Cora E. Lutz, Musonius
Rufus "the Roman Socrates, "X YALE CLAssicAL

STUDIES

85-89 (1947).

[34a. The obvious and intended meaning of this sentence is precisely
what Perry says "Finnis does not mean". Perry, supra note 15, at 47. Perry's
failure to grasp and engage with the argument conveyed in my text begins right
here, at the beginning.]
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Germain Grisez and others. A fuller exposition can be found in
the chapter on marriage, sexual acts, and family life, in the new
second volume of Grisez's great work on moral theology.3 5
Plato's mature concern, in the Laws, for familiarity, affection
and love between spouses in a chastely exclusive marriage, Aristotle's representation of marriage as an intrinsically desirable
friendship between quasi-equals, and as a state of life even more
natural to human beings than political life, 6 and Musonius
Rufus's conception of the inseparable double goods of marriage,
all find expression in Plutarch's celebration of marriage-as a
union not of mere instinct but of reasonable love, and not
merely for procreation but for mutual help, goodwill and cooperation for their own sake.3 7 Plutarch's severe critiques of homosexual conduct (and of the disparagement of women implicit in
homosexual ideology),8 develop Plato's critique of homosexual
and all other extra-marital sexual conduct. Like Musonius Rufus,
Plutarch does so by bringing much closer to explicit articulation
the following thought. Genital intercourse between spouses
enables them to actualize and experience (and in that sense
express) their marriage itself, as a single reality with two blessings
(children and mutual affection)." Non-marital intercourse, espe35. 2 GERMAIN Gmistz, THE WAY OF THE LORD JESUS, Living a ChristianLife
555-574, 633-680 (1993).
36. AisroTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHics, VIII,12: 1162al6-30; see also the
probably pseudo-Aristotle, Oeconomica I, 3-4: 1343b12-1344a22; III.
37. Plutarch reads this conception back to the dawn of Athenian
civilization and, doubtless anachronistically, ascribes it to the great original
Athenian law-giver, Solon: Marriage should be "a union of life between man
and woman for the delights of love and the getting of children." PLUTARCH, Lim
OF SOLON

20, 4. See also PLUTARCH'

EROTIKOS

769:

In the case of lawful wives, physical union is the beginning of
friendship, a sharing, as it were, in great mysteries. [The] pleasure is
short [or unimportant: mikron], but the respect and kindness and
mutual affection and loyalty that daily spring from it [conjugal sex]
convicts neither the Delphians of raving when they call Aphrodite
'Harmony' nor Homer when he designates-such a union 'friendship'.
It also proves that Solon was a very experienced legislator of marriage
laws. He prescribed that a man should consort with his wife not less
than three times a month-not for the pleasure surely, but as cities
renew their mutual agreements from time to time, just so he must
have wished this to be a renewal of marriage and with such an act of
tenderness to wipe out the complaints that accumulate from everyday
living.
38. See PLUTARCH, ERoTiKos 768D-770A; IX MoRALA 427 (Loeb ed.,
1961); see also the fine translation in D.A. RussELL, PLUTARCH 92 (1973).
39. Plutarch speaks of the union of husband and wife as an "integral
amalgamation" [di' holon krasis]. PLUTARCH, EROTIKOS 769F; CONIUGALIA
PRAECEPTA

142F.
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cially but not only homosexual; has no such point and therefore
is unacceptable.
The core of this argument can, be clarified by comparing it
with Saint Augustine's treatment of marriage in his De Bono Coniugali. The good of marital communion is here an instrumental
good, in the service of the procreation and education of children
so that the intrinsic, non-instrumental good of friendship will be
promoted and realized by the propagation of the human race,
and the intrinsic good of inner integration be, promoted and
realized by the "remedying" of the disordered desires of concupiscence.40 Now, when considering sterile marriages, Augustine
had identified a further good of marriage, the natural societas
(companionship) of the two sexes.4 1 Had he truly integrated this
into his synthesis, he would have recognized that in sterile and
fertile marriages alike, the communion, companionship, societas
and amicitia of the spouses-their being married-is .the very
good of marriage, and is an intrinsic, basic human good; not
merely instrumental to any other good. And this communion of
married life, this integral amalgamation of the lives of the two
4s
persons (as Plutarch 42 put it before John Paul II),
has as its
intrinsic elements, as essential parts of one and the same good,
the goods and ends to which the theological tradition, following
Augustine, for a long time subordinated that communion. It
took a long and gradual process of development of doctrine,
through the Catechism of the Council of Trent, the teachings of
Pius XI and Pius XII, and eventually those of Vatican Il-a process brilliantly illuminated by Germain Grisez 44 -to bring the
tradition to the position that procreation and children are
neither the end (whether primary or secondary) to which marriage is instrumental (as Augustine taught), nor instrumental to
the good of the spouses (as much secular and "liberal Christian"
thought supposes), but rather: Parenthood and children 'and
family are the intrinsic fulfillment of a communion ivhich,
because it is not merely instrumental, can exist and fulfill the
spouses even if procreation happens to be impossible for them.
Now if, as the recent encyclical on the foundations of morality, Veritatis Splendor, teaches, "the communion of persons in marriage" which is violated by every act of adultery is itself a
40.

ST. AUGUSTINE, DE BONO CONIUGALI, 9.9.

41.

Id. at 3.3.

42.

PLUTARCH, EROTIKOS 769f; CONIUGALIA PRAECEPTA 142f.

43. John Paul II, Address to Young Married Couples at Taranto (October
1989), quoted in GRISEZ, supra note 35, at 571 n.46 ("a great project: fusing your
persons to the point of becoming 'one flesh' ").
44. GiusFz, supra note 35, at 556-569.
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"fundamental human good,"4 5 there fall into place not only the
elements of the classic philosophical judgments on non-marital
sexual conduct but also the similar judgments reached about
such conduct by decent people who cannot articulate explanatory premises for those judgments, which they reach rather by an
insight into what is and is not consistent with realities whose goodness they experience and understand at least sufficiently to will
and choose. In particular, there fall into place the elements of an
answer to the question: Why cannot non-marital friendship be
promoted and expressed by sexual acts? Why is the attempt to
express affection by orgasmic non-marital sex the pursuit of an
illusion? Why did Plato and Socrates, Xenophon, Aristotle,
Musonius Rufus, and Plutarch, right at the heart of their reflections on the homoerotic culture around them, make the very
deliberate and careful judgment that homosexual conduct (and
indeed all extra-marital sexual gratification) is radically incapable of participating in, actualizing, the common good of
friendship?
Implicit in the philosophical and common-sense rejection of
extra-marital sex is the answer: The union of the reproductive
organs of husband and wife really unites them biologically (and
their biological reality is part of, not merely an instrument of,
their personal reality); reproduction is one function and so, in
respect of that function, the spouses are indeed one reality, and
their sexual union therefore can actualize and allow them to experience their real common good-their marriage with the two goods,
parenthood and friendship, which (leaving aside the order of
grace) are the parts of its wholeness as an intelligible common
good even if, independently of what the spouses will, their capacity for biological parenthood will not be fulfilled by that act of
genital union. But the common good of friends who are not and
cannot be married (for example, man and man, man and boy,
woman and woman) has nothing to do with their having children
by each other, and their reproductive organs cannot make them
a biological (and therefore personal) unit.46 So their sexual acts
45. JOHN PAUL II, VERrrATIS SPLENDOR 11 13, 48 (1984); see also id. at I
50, 67, 78, 79.
46. Steven Macedo, The New Natural Lauyers, THE HARV. CRIMSON, Oct.
28, 1993, writes:
In effect, gays can have sex in a way that is open to procreation, and to
new life. They can be, and many are, prepared to engage in the kind
of loving relations that would result in procreation-were conditions
different. Like sterile married couples, many would like nothing
better.
Here, fantasy has taken leave of reality. Anal or oral intercourse, whether

between spouses or between males, is no more a biological union "open to pro-
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together cannot do what they may hope and imagine. Because
their activation of one or even each of their reproductive organs
cannot be an actualizing and experiencing of the maritalgoodas marital intercourse (intercourse between spouses in a marital
way) can, even between spouses who happen to be sterile-it can
do no more than provide each partner with an individual gratification. For want of a common good that could be actualized and
experienced by and in this bodily union, that conduct involves the
partners in treating their bodies as instruments to be used in the
service of their consciously experiencing selves; their choice to
engage in such conduct thus dis-integrates each of them precisely as acting persons.4 7
Reality is known in judgment, not in emotion, and in reality,
whatever the generous hopes and dreams and thoughts of giving
with which some same-sex partners may surround their sexual
acts, those acts cannot express or do more than is expressed or
done if two strangers engage in such activity to give each other
pleasure, or a prostitute pleasures a client to give him pleasure in
return for money, or (say) a man masturbates to give himself
pleasure and a fantasy of more human relationships after a gruelling day on the assembly line. This is, I believe, the substance of
Plato's judgment-at that moment in the Gorgias which is also
decisive for the moral and political philosophical critique of
hedonism 4"-that there is no important distinction in essential
moral worthlessness between solitary masturbation, being
creation" than is intercourse with a goat by a shepherd who fantasizes about
breeding a faun; each "would" yield the desired mutant "were conditions different". Biological union between humans is the inseminatory union of male genital organ with female genital organ; in most circumstances it does not result in
generation, but it is the behavior that unites biologically because it is the behavior which, as behavior, is suitable for generation.
47. For the whole argument, see GRISEZ, supra note 35, at 634-39, 648-54,
662-4.
48. PLATO, GORGiAS 494-5, especially 494el-5, 495b3. [The phrase "no
important distinction in essential moral worthlessness" articulates the judgment
on masturbation and sodomy, as types of choice, which is clearly implicit in this
passage of the Gorgias, read with attention. As the present sentence and the
preceding sentence of my text taken together indicate, I want to go below the
surface of Plato'sjudgment here, to find in it the more precise claim made in
that preceding sentence. Neither I nor Grisez ever make the silly claim
(repeatedly attributed to us by Perry) that they (however confusedly) intend
their sex acts to be generously marital and the whole reality involved in sexual
conduct engaged in as commercial explotation of impersonal lust. It should go
without saying that the badness of choosing a morally bad type of act is affected
(though not eliminated) by good motivations and can be mitigated also by
other aspects of the context (circumstances). My concern in this section of my
article is not with degrees of culpability of particular acts, nor even with the
question of the differing, or similar gravity of various types of sexual acts
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sodomized as a prostitute, and being sodomized for the pleasure
of it. Sexual acts cannot in reality be self-giving unless they are
acts by which a man and. a woman actualize and experience sexually the real giving of themselves to each other-in biological,
affective and volitional union in mutual commitment, both openended and exclusive-which like Plato and Aristotle and most
peoples we call marriage.
In short, sexual acts are not unitive in their significance
unless they are marital, (actualizing the all-level unity of marriage) and (since the common good of marriage has two aspects)
they are not marital unless they have not only the generosity of
acts of friendship but also the procreative significance, not necessarily of being intended to generate or capable in the circumstances of generating but at least of being, as human conduct,
acts of the reproductive kind-actualizations, so far as the
spouses then and there can, of the reproductive function in
which they are biologically and thus personally one.
The ancient philosophers do not much discuss the case of
sterile marriages, or the fact (well known to them) that for long
periods of time (e.g. throughout pregnancy) the sexual acts of a
married.couple are naturally incapable of resulting in reproduction. They appear to take for granted what the subsequent Christian tradition certainly did, that such sterility does not render the
conjugal sexual acts of the spouses non-marital. (Plutarch indicates that intercourse with a sterile spouse is a desirable mark of
marital esteem and affection.)4 9 For: A husband and wife who
unite their reproductive organs in an act of sexual intercourse
which, so far as they then can make it, is of a kind suitable for
considered as types, but exclusively with the question whether certain types of
acts are morally right or wrong.]
49. PLUTARCH, LIFE OF SOLON, 20,3. The post-Christian moral philosophy
of Kant identified the wrongfulness of masturbation and homosexual (and
bestial) conduct as consisting in the instrumentalisation of one's body, and thus
("since a person is an absolute unity") the "wrong to humanity in our own
person." But Kant, though he emphasizes the equality of husband and wife
(impossible in concubinage or more casual prostitution), did not integrate this
insight with an understanding of marriage as a single two-part good involving,
inseparably, friendship as well as procreation. Hence he was puzzled by the
question' why marital intercourse is right when the woman is pregnant or
beyond the menopause. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 27779, 424-26 (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991, 96-97, 220-22)
(1797). The deep source of his puzzlement is his refusal to allow intelligible
goods any structural role in his ethics, a refusal which sets him against a classical
moral philosophy such as Aristotle's, and indeed against any adequate theory of
natural law, and in turn is connected with his dualistic separation of body from
mind and body, a separation which conflicts with his own insight, just quoted,
that the person is a real unity.
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generation, do function as a biological (and thus personal) unit
and thus can be actualizing and experiencing the two-in-oneflesh common good and reality of marriage, even when ,some
biological condition happens to prevent that unity resulting in
generation of a child. Their conduct thus differs radically from
the acts of a husband and wife whose intercourse is masturbatory,
for example sodomitic or by fellatio or coitus interruptus.5 ° In
law .such acts do not consummate a marriage, because in reality
(whatever the couple's illusions of intimacy and self-giving in
such acts) they do not actualize the one-flesh, two-part marital
good.
Does this account seek to "make moral judgments based on
natural facts"?5 Yes and no. No, in the sense that it does not seek
to infer normative conclusions or theses from non-normative
(natural-fact) premises. Nor does. it appeal to any norm of the
form "Respect natural facts or natural functions." But yes, it does
apply the relevant practical reasons (especially that marriage and
inner integrity are basic human goods). and moral principles
(especially that one may never intend to destroy, damage,
impede, or violate any basic human good, or prefer an illusory
instantiation of a basic human good to a real instantiation of that
or some other human good) to facts about the human personal
organism.
VI.
Societies such as classical Athens and contemporary England
(and virtually every other) draw a distinction between behavior
found merely (perhaps extremely) offensive (such as eating
excrement), and behavior to be repudiated as destructive of
human character and relationships.' Copulation of humans with
animals is repudiated because it treats human sexual activity and
satisfaction as something appropriately sought in a manner as
50.

Or deliberately contracepted, which I omit from the list in the text

only because it would no doubt not now be accepted by secular civil law as
preventing consummation-a failure of understanding. See discussion, supra
note 46.
51. Macedo, supra note 46, at 2:
All we can say is that conditions would have to be more radically
different in the case of gay and lesbian couples than sterile married
couples for new life to result from sex.., but what is the moral force
of that? The new natural law theory does not make moral judgments
based on natural facts.
Macedo's phrase "based on" equivocates between the first premises of normative arguments (which must be normative) and the other premise(s) (which
can and normally should be factual and, where appropriate, can refer to natural facts such as that the human mouth is not a reproductive organ).
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divorced from the actualizing of an intelligible common good as
is the instinctive coupling of beasts-and so treats human bodily
life, in one of its most intense activities, as appropriately lived as
merely animal. The deliberate genital coupling of persons of the
same sex is repudiated for a very similar reason. It is not simply
that it is sterile and disposes the participants to an abdication of
responsibility for the future of humankind. Nor is it simply that it
cannot really actualize the mutual devotion which some homosexual persons hope to manifest and experience by it, and that it
harms the personalities of its participants by its dis-integrative
manipulation of different parts of their one personal reality. It is
also that it treats human sexual capacities in a way which is
deeply hostile to the self-understanding of those members of the
community who are willing to commit themselves to real marriage in the understanding that its sexual joys are not mere
instruments or accompaniments to, or mere compensations for,
the accomplishment of marriage's responsibilities, but rather
enable the spouses to actualize and experience their intelligent commitment to share in those responsibilities, in that genuine selfgiving.
Now, as I have said before, "homosexual orientation," in one
of the two main senses of that highly equivocal term, is precisely
the deliberate willingness to promote and engage in homosexual
acts-the state of mind, will, and character whose self-interpretation came to be expressed in the deplorable but helpfully
revealing name "gay." So this willingness, and the whole "gay"
ideology, treats human sexual capacities in a way which is deeply
hostile to the self-understanding of those members of the community who are willing to commit themselves to real marriage.
Homosexual orientation in this sense is, in fact, a standing
denial of the intrinsic aptness of sexual intercourse to actualize
and in that sense give expression to the exclusiveness and openended commitment of marriage as something good in itself. All
who accept that homosexual acts can be a humanly appropriate
use of sexual capacities must, if consistent, regard sexual capacities, organs and acts as instruments for gratifying the individual
"selves" who have them. Such an acceptance is commonly (and in
my opinion rightly) judged to be an active threat to the stability
of existing and future marriages; it makes nonsense, for example,
of the view that adultery is per se (and not merely because it may
involve deception), and in an important way, inconsistent with
conjugal love. A political community which judges that the stability and protective and educative generosity of family life is of fundamental importance to that community's present and future
can rightly judge that it has a compelling interest in denying that
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homosexual conduct-a "gay lifestyle"-is a valid, humanly
acceptable choice and form of life, and in doing whatever it properly can, as a community with uniquely wide but still subsidiary
functions, to discourage such conduct.
VII.
I promised to defend the judgment that the government of
political communities is subsidiary, and rationally limited not
only by constitutional law and by the moral norms which limit
every decent person's deliberation and choice, but also by the
inherent limits of its general justifying aim, purpose or rationale.
That rationale is, of course, the common good of the political
community. And that common good, I shall argue, is not basic,
intrinsic or constitutive, but rather is instrumental.
Every community is constituted by the communication and
cooperation between its members. To say that a community has a
common good is simply to say that communication and cooperation have a point which the members more or less concur in
understanding, valuing and pursuing. There are three types of
common good which each provide the constitutive point of a distinctive type of open-ended community and directly instantiate a
basic human good: (1) the affectionate mutual help and shared
enjoyment of the friendship and communio of "real friends"; (2)
the sharing of husband and wife in married life, united as complementary, bodily persons whose activities make them apt for
parenthood-the communio of spouses and, if their marriage is
fruitful, their children; (3) the communio of religious believers
cooperating in the devotion and service called for by what they
believe to be the accessible truths about the ultimate source of
meaning, value and other realities, and about the ways in which
human beings can be in harmony with that ultimate source.
Other human communities either are dedicated to accomplishing
a specific goal or set of goals (like a university or hospital) and so
are not in the open-ended service of their members, or have a
common good which is instrumental rather than basic. One
should notice here that association and cooperation, even when
oriented towards goals which are both specific and instrumentally rather than basically and intrinsically good (as, e.g., in a
business enterprise), have a more than merely instrumental character inasmuch as they instantiate the basic good of friendship in
one or other of its central or non-central forms.
The political community-properly understood as one of
the forms of collaboration needed for the sake of the basic goods
identified in the first principles of natural law-is a community
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cooperating in the service of a common good which is instrumental, not itself basic. True, it is a good which is "great and
godlike " " in its ambitious range: "to secure the whole ensemble
of material and other conditions, including forms of collaboration, that tend to favor, facilitate, and foster the realization by
each individual [in that community] of his or her personal development"53 (which will in each case include, constitutively, the
flourishing of the family, friendship and other communities to
which that person belongs). True too, its proper range includes
the regulation of friendships, marriage, families, and religious
associations, as well as of all the many organizations and associations which are dedicated to specific goals or which, like the state
itself, have only an instrumental (e.g. an economic) common
good. But such regulation of these associations should never (in
the case of the associations with a non-instrumental common
good) or only exceptionally (in the case of instrumental associations) be intended to take over the formation, direction or management of these personal initiatives and interpersonal
associations. Rather, its purpose must be to carry out the subsidi54 of
ary (i.e. helping, from the Latin subsidium, help) function
assisting individuals and groups to coordinate their activities for
the objectives and commitments they have chosen, and to do so
in ways consistent with the other aspects of the common good of
this community, uniquely complex, far-reaching and demanding
and its monopoin its rationale, its requirements of cooperation,
55
lization of force: the political community.
52. AwsroTL, NicoMcAN ETHics, 1,1: 1094b9.
53. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 147 (1980). As I
indicate, this account of the common good of the political community is close
to that worked out by French commentators on Aquinas in the early midtwentieth century. Id. at 160. A similar account was adopted by the Second
Vatican Council: "the sum of those conditions of social life which allow social
groups and their individual members relatively thorough and ready access to
their own fulfillment." GAUDIUM ET SPES 1 26 (1965); see also DIGNrrATIS
HuMANAE 1 6 (1965).
54. See FINNIs, supra note 53, at 146-47, 159.
55. Of course, the common good of the political community has
important elements which are scarcely shared with any other community within
the polity: for example, the restoration ofjustice by punishment of those who
have offended against just laws; the coercive repelling and restraint of those
whose conduct (including negligent omissions) unfairly threatens the interests
of others, particularly those interests identified as moral ("human") or legal
rights, and corresponding compulsory measures to secure restitution,
compensation or reparation for violations of rights; and the specifying and
upholding of a system of holding or property rights which respects the various
interests, immediate and vested or remote and contingent, which everyone has
in each holding. But the fact that these and various other elements of the
political common good are peculiar to the political community and the proper
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The fundamentally instrumental character of the political
common good is indicated by both parts of the Second Vatican
Council's teaching about religious liberty, a teaching considered
by the Council to be a matter of natural law (i.e. of "reason
itself").6 The first part of the teaching is that everyone has the
right not to be coerced in matters of religious belief and practice.
For, to know the truth about the ultimate matters compendiously
called by the Council "religious;" and to, adhere to and put into
practice the truth one has come to know, is so significant a good
and so basic a responsibility, and the attainment of that "good of
the human spirit""' is so inherently and non-substitutably a matter of personal assent and conscientious decision, that if a government intervenes coercively in people's search for true religious
beliefs, or in people's expression of the beliefs they suppose true,
it will harm those people and violate their dignity even when its
intervention is based on the correct premise that their search has
been negligently conducted and/or has led them into false
beliefs. Religious acts, according to the Council, "transcend" the
sphere which is proper to government; government is to care for
the temporal common good, and this includes [the subsidiary
function of] acknowledging and fostering the religious life of its
citizens but governments have no responsibility or right' to direct
religious
acts, and "exceed their proper limits" if they presume to
58
do so.
The second part of the Council's teaching concerns the
proper restrictions on religious freedom, namely those restrictions which are
required for [i] the effective protection of the rights of all citizens and of their peaceful coexistence, [ii] a sufficient care
for the authentic public peace of an ordered common life in
true justice, and [iii] a proper upholding of public morality.
All these factors constitute the fundamental part of the
common good, and come under, the notion of ordre;
public.59
responsibility of its leaders, the government, in no way entails that these
elements are basic human goods or that the political common good is other
than in itself instrumental.
56. DiGNITATIS HUMANAE 1 2. In the succeeding part, the Declaration
treats the matter as one of divine revelation. Id. at 1 9-14.
57. It is one of the animi humani bona mentioned in id., 1.
58. "Potestas igitur civilis, cuius finis proprius est bonum commune
temporale curare, religiosam quidem civium vitam agnoscere eique favere
debet, sed limites suos excedere dicenda est, si actus religiosos dirigere vel
impedire praesumat." Id. at 1 3.

59. Id. at 1 7.-
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Here, too, the political common good is presented as instrumental, serving the protection of human and legal rights, public
peace and public morality-in other words, the preservation of a
social environment conducive to virtue. Government is precisely
not presented here as dedicated to the commanding of virtue
and the repressing of vice, as such, even though virtue (and vice)
are of supreme and constitutive importance for the well-being
(or otherwise) of individual persons and the worth (or otherwise) of their associations.
Is the Council's natural law teaching right? Or should we
rather adhere to the uncomplicated theory of Aquinas's treatise
On Princely Government, that government should command
whatever leads people towards their ultimate (heavenly) end, forbid whatever deflects them from it, and coercively deter people
from evil-doing and induce them to morally decent conduct?'
Perhaps the most suasive short statement of that teaching is still
Aristotle's famous attack on theories which, like the sophist
Lycophron's, treat the state as a mere mutual insurance arrangement?6" But in two crucial respects, at least, Aristotle (and with
him the tradition) has taken things too easily.
60. DE REGIMFNE PUNCiPUM c.14 ( ... ab iniquitate coerceat et ad opera
virtuosa inducat). This thesis is qualified, though not abandoned, in other
works of Aquinas. Thus Summa Theologiae 11-II q.104 a.5c teaches that human
government has no authority over people's minds and the interior motions of
their wills. Id. I-I q.9 6 a.2 teaches that governmental pursuit of virtue should be
gradual and should not ask too much of the average citizen (who is not
virtuous).
61. It states:
[T]hepois was formed not for the sake of life only but rather for the
good life ... and ... its purpose is not [merely] military alliance for
defence ... and it does not exist [merely] for the sake of trade and

business relations.., any polis which is truly so called, and is not one
merely in name, must have virtue/excellence as an object of its care
[peri aretes epimeks einai be solicitous about virtue]. Otherwise a polis
sinks into a mere alliance, differing only in space from other forms of
alliance where the members live at a distance from each other.
Otherwise, too, the law becomes a mere social contract [syntheke:
covenant]-or (in the phrase of the sophist Lycophron) 'a guarantor
of justice as between one man and another'-instead of being, as it
should be, such as will make [poiein] the citizens good and just ....
The polis is not merely a sharing of a common locality for the purpose
of preventing mutual injury and exchanging goods. These are
necessary preconditions of the existence of a polis. . but a polis is a
communio [koinonia] of clans [and neighborhoods] in living well, with
the object of a full and self-sufficient [autaltous] life . . . it must

therefore be for the sake of truly good (kalon) actions, not of merely
living together.
AasToTLE, PoLITcs, 111.5: 1280a32, a35, 1280b7-13, b30-31, b34, 1281al-4.
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First If the object, point or common good of the political
community were indeed a self-sufficient life, and if self-sufficiency (autarcheia)were indeed what Aristotle defines it to be-a
life lacking in nothing, of complete fulfillment 6 2-then we
would have to say that the political community has a point it cannot hope to achieve, a common good utterly beyond its reach.
For subsequent philosophical reflection has confirmed what one
might suspect from Aristotle's own manifest. oscillation between
different conceptions of eudaimonia (and thus of autarcheia):Integral human fulfillment is nothing less than the fulfillment of (in
principle) all human persons in all communities and cannot be
achieved in any community short of the heavenly kingdom, a
community envisaged not by unaided reason (natural law theory)
but only by virtue of divine revelation and attainable only by a
divine gift which transcends the capacities of nature. To be sure,
integral human fulfillment can and should be a conception central to a natural law theory of morality and thus of politics, and
should be envisaged as a kind of ideal community (to which will
answer the reality of the Kingdom which Christian faith's first
moral norm directs us to seek).63 But that ideal community is
not, as early natural law theories such as Aristotle's prematurely
proposed, the political community.
Second&When Aristotle speaks of "making" people good, he
constantly" uses the word poiesis which he has so often contrasted with praxis and reserved for techniques ("arts") of
manipulating matter.6" But helping citizens to choose and act in
line with integral human fulfillment must involve something
which goes beyond any art or technique. For only individual acting persons can by their own choices make themselves good or
62. AiusToTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETmics, I, 7:1097b8. This, incidentally,
differs widely from what STEPHEN MACEDO, LBERAL VIRTUES 215-17 (1990),
means by "an autarchic person."
63. For nothing less than integral human fulfillment, the fulfillment of all
persons in all the basic human goods, answers to reason's full knowledge of,
and the will's full interest in, the human good in which one can participate by
action. And so the first principle of a sound morality must be: In voluntarily
acting for human goods and avoiding what is opposed to them, one ought to
choose and will those and only those possibilities whose willing is compatible
with integral human fulfillment. To say that immorality is constituted by cutting
back on, fettering, reason by passions is equivalent to saying that the sway of
feelings over reason constitutes immorality by deflecting one to objectives not
in line with integral human fulfillment. This ideal community is thus the good
will's most fundamental orientating ideal.
64. Apart from the passage just cited, see AusroTLE, NICOMACHEAN
ETHics, I, 10; 1099b32; II, 1: 110364; X, 9: 1180b24.
65. E.g. AwSToTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETmics, VI, 5: 1140a2; AmisToTLE,
PoLmcs, 1, 2: 1254a5.
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evil. Not that their life should or can be individualistic; their
deliberating and choosing will be shaped, and helped or hindered, by the language of their culture, by their family, their
friends, their associates and enemies, the customs of their communities, the laws of their polity, and by the impress of human
influences of many kinds from beyond their homeland. Their
choices will involve them in relationships just or unjust, generous
or illiberal, vengeful or charitable, with other persons in all these
communities. And as members of all these communities they
have some responsibility to encourage their fellow-members in
morally good and discourage them from morally bad conduct.
To be sure, the political community is a cooperation which
undertakes the unique tasks of giving coercive protection to all
individuals and lawful associations within its domain, and of
securing an economic and cultural environment in which all
these persons and groups can pursue their own proper good. To
be sure, this common good of the political community makes it
far more than a mere arrangement for "preventing mutual injury
and exchanging goods." But it is one thing to maintain, as reason
requires, that the political community's rationale requires that its
public managing structure, the state, should deliberately and
publicly identify, encourage, facilitate and support the truly
worthwhile (including moral. virtue), should deliberately and
publicly identify, discourage and hinder the harmful and evil,
and should, by its criminal prohibitions and sanctions (as well as
its other laws and policies), assist people with parental responsibilities to educate children and young people in virtue and to
discourage their vices. It is another thing to maintain that that
rationale requires or authorizes the state to direct people to virtue and deter them from vice by making even secret and truly
consensual adult acts of vice a punishable offence against the
state's laws.'
So there was a sound and important distinction of principle
which the Supreme Court of the United States overlooked in
moving from Griswold v. Connecticut 7 (private use of contraceptives by spouses) to Eisenstadt v. Baird (public distributionof contra66. So a third way in which Aristotle takes things too easily is his slide
from upholding government's responsibility to assist or substitute for the direct
parental discipline of youth, to claiming that this responsibility continues, and
in the same direct coercive form, "to cover the whole of a lifetime, since most
people obey necessity rather than argument, and punishments rather than the
sense of what is truly worthwhile." Aisro'rt,
NicoMAcHwtN ETmics,
X.9:1180al-3.
67.. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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ceptives to unmarriedpeople).6 The truth and relevance of that
distinction, and its high importance for the common good,
would be overlooked again if laws criminalizing private acts of
sodomy between adults were to be struck down by the Court on
any ground which would also constitutionally require the law to
tolerate the advertising or, marketing of homosexual services, the
maintenance of places of resort for homosexual activity, or the
promotion of homosexualist "lifestyles" via education and public
media of communication, or to recognize homosexual "marriages" or permit the adoption of children by homosexually
active people, and so forth.

68. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). The law struck down in Griswold was the law
forbidding use of contraceptives even by married persons; Griswold's conviction
as an accessory to such use fell with the fall of the substantive law against the
principals in such use. Very different, in principle, would have been a law
directly forbidding Griswold's activities as a public promoter of contraceptive
information and supplies. If American constitutional law fails to recognize such
distinctions, it shows, I suggest, its want of sound principle.

